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Criminal organizations, with the advent of new information technologies, have found 
additional ways and spaces through which to commit crimes, especially in online hidden 
markets and through new means of laundering illicit proceeds. The opening of these new 
illegal markets has helped to increase the capital of criminal organizations which, if 
spread and rooted in the territory, can influence the various spheres of politics and 
decision-making processes of an entire country. Despite the seriousness of the threat, 
organised crime is not sufficiently understood. Although regulatory interventions and 
actions to prevent and combat cybercrimes perpetrated by organised crime have been 
implemented, through the international collaboration of the police forces with the 
various investigative agencies, the individual states intend to maintain full sovereignty 
in the area of criminal justice; all this leads to a lack of uniformity between both national 
and European institutions in the area of organized crime, while adequate regulation is 
still lacking in the dark web. In the light of the exponential increase in online criminal 
activity in recent years and even 25% between the first and second quarter of 2020 due to 
the coronavirus emergency, it is therefore essential that the individual Member States put 
aside uncertainties, exploiting the European Union as a fulcrum in the fight against 
transnational organised crime. A common solution would be to criminalize access to 
some areas of the Onion Routing, integrate the provisions of the article 416 of the Penal 
Code to apply them also to the digital context and establish the crime of mafia-type 
criminal association in the European legislative landscape as explained in article 416-bis 
of the Italian Penal Code. 
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1. The organised cybercrime 
 
Organized crime is a form of associated delinquency which presupposes a stable 
organization of several people to commit multiple crimes, to obtain, directly or indirectly, 
financial or material advantages. Over the years, organized crime has diversified, become 
global and has reached macroeconomic proportions: illicit goods come from one 
continent, are trafficked in another, and traded in a third. Crime is fuelling corruption, 
infiltrating business, and politics, hindering development and governance by 
empowering those who operate outside the law. Despite the seriousness of the threat, 
organized crime is not sufficiently understood (Costa, 2010). In many cases, a lack of 
international understanding of terminology can cause incorrect legislative responses at 
the national level, which limit the effectiveness of crime control and prevention measures 
(Eu Parliamentary question, 2018). For example, the mafia should not be confused with a 
criminal association but represents an entity parallel to the public authority aiming to 
"replacing them" (Falcone, 1991). Yet, this distinction, made explicit in article 416-bis 
(Crime of Mafia-type association) of the Italian Penal Code, remains a unique case in the 
European legislative landscape. Thus mafia-type criminal organizations take advantage 
of softer legislation to transfer their business and interests there. 
 The danger highlighted by investigators, across Europe, is the conditioning these 
organizations have on the economy, the market and free competition. The expansion of 
the new means of communication enabled by network technologies has meant that 
connections, alliances, and commercial relationships have been established by optimizing 
and expanding the operations of criminal organizations around the globe. The digital 
revolution has also allowed organised crime to evolve, adapting to new technologies and 
innovating. Criminal groups today are decentralized and with the help of technology, 
they create channels and relationships in different countries with more actors, more 
means, using cutting-edge payment methods. Mafias around the world exploit 
information and communication in the same way as legitimate businesses and use 
cybercrime to finance their traditional operations (IOCTA, 2019).  
 The world of cybercrime, especially in recent years, is home to a multiplicity of 
actors of different kinds: from cyber-terrorists to individual hackers, from old criminal 
organisations to new specialised groups committing offences on the net. Organised crime 
groups operate on the net with different functions and social impacts (McGuire, 2012). 
An increasing number of academic studies and reports from cybersecurity companies 
demonstrate the varieties of organizational structures that are involved in cybercrime and 
have expanded the notion of organized crime to profit-related criminal phenomena 
occurring completely or partially in cyberspace (Leukfeldt, Lavorgna, & Kleemans, 2017). 
There are in fact forms of crime that operate exclusively online, others that operate in a 
mixed manner and still others, mainly offline (Leukfeldt et al., 2017). The digitized 
organized criminal groups act in a specific way in the cryptocurrency relationship and 
anonymous networks, playing three key roles to carry out the various illicit activities. 
a) Criminal organizations can become 'suppliers of products and services' by acting 
through the '.onion' sites in the Darknets that lend themselves to proliferating illicit 
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businesses. The multiple products sold range from drugs to weapons, malware and 
illegally acquired personal data and information and then resold on online markets. 
Another traditional activity under the influence of organized crime is the online 
gambling which manages huge volumes of transactions and cash flows which 
unfortunately can hide and mask money laundering (Romiti, 2014). Suffice it to say 
that the number of unauthorized sites exceeds by more than ten times that of 
operators who are (Romiti, 2014). Many of these sites, if not most (Choi, 2018), operate 
in the Darknets allowing payments through cryptocurrencies. These methods thus 
make illegal gaming portals protected by anonymity. All goods and services made 
available in the Darknets can be purchased through cryptocurrency and it is, 
therefore, necessary for organizations to invest in bitcoin or other types of virtual 
currencies to kick-start such mechanisms. 
b) Furthermore, criminal organizations can become 'cryptocurrency investors'. In addition 
to the misuse of it in Darkmarkets, there are several reasons why organized crime 
wants to invest in cryptocurrencies (that is, a digital payment method based on 
blockchain technology and cryptographic procedures such as hash functions and 
digital signatures). Not being supported by any central government or authority, they 
are not subject to the political or economic pressures that regulate central bank and 
private money issuing authorities (Matonis, 2012). Transactions can be carried out 
across borders without the limits that come from the extensive authorization process 
required for the use of credit cards (J.P. & G.T., 2011). This combination of elements 
makes crypto-currency highly attractive to criminal organizations, not only to operate 
illicit online markets but as a means for other criminal purposes and investments. One 
of the main purposes of criminal organizations is to remove money from its illicit 
origins, hindering the traceability of the origins of the proceeds. Cryptocurrencies are 
a new way of hiding the identity of illegally generated proceeds, and a way of hiding 
the identity of the user. The use of cryptocurrencies in the context of cyber money 
laundering is an activity that has entered the practice of many criminal organizations 
(Irwin & Milad, 2016); money can be laundered faster through virtual currencies than 
traditional means, having the ability to divide the capital into multiple accounts. 
Finally, organized crime would be investing in the stock exchange and Bitcoin 
(Cipolla, 2018), precisely to pursue purposes related to money laundering. 
c) Finally, criminal organizations interface with the Onion Routing (i.e. the technique 
that makes network communications anonymous) and cryptocurrencies through 
direct involvement in a cyber action 'acting as a guiding hand' in certain operations. 
These actions are perpetrated through the recruitment of personnel qualified in the 
use of IT techniques or by real cybercriminal groups that act exclusively online. Forms 
of organized cybercrime take the opportunity to carry out numerous attacks aimed at 
destroying, abusing, or blocking computer systems (IOCTA, 2019). In addition to 
viruses or malware that cause serious damage to databases, software or websites, a 
crime particularly perpetrated by cybercriminals is extortion through computer 
networks (IOCTA, 2019). Extortion on computer networks has become a regular 
practice in recent years and many organized groups follow this example through the 
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help of DoS (i.e. Denial-of-Service that persists in an attempt to prevent legitimate 
users to access information or services within your system) or malware, using 
cryptocurrencies and anonymity to make you lose track of your work. Through 
skimming, phishing, banking Trojans (program intent on spying on a banking 
computer) or other online fraud, the carders acquire credit card numbers or violate 
banking systems and then resell all the material on the dark web. The explanation for 
this behaviour is that it seems easier to sell stolen credit cards than to use them. The 
Darknets markets ensure the anonymity of transactions allowing carders to remain 
safe.  
 
2. The underground economy of organised crime in the digital age 
 
The underground economy of cybercrime is extremely vast, and its size and structure are 
often difficult to understand. Today the 'Darkmarkets' host a multiplicity of participants 
and are constantly changing due to their illegal nature. Despite this, over time the black 
markets of the network have established themselves, creating their ever-growing 
clientele (IOCTA, 2019). A market of this kind is nothing more than a hidden service 
implemented by anonymous software, such as the Onion Routing that makes users' IP 
addresses untraceable. Illegal trade is enabled by the sites loaded on such services which 
allow buyers and sellers to interact and trade anonymously. The 'Darknets' markets allow 
payments through cryptocurrencies by obfuscating transactions. There are currently two 
types of dark web commercial entities: 'crypto-markets' and so-called 'vendor shops' 
(Paoli et al., 2017), single sellers, connected or linked to markets. 
 Crypto markets bring together multiple sellers managed by a group of market 
administrators (i.e. of the web page) in exchange for a commission on sales, an activity 
that mirrors what happens in the 'Clearnet' with Amazon and eBay. The services offer 
exchange methods that allow transactions to be made, using cryptocurrency, followed by 
feedback (on a scale from 0 to 5 stars) linked to each purchase, with aggregate scores and 
viewable on the marketplace to guide the customers in the selection of reliable suppliers 
and highly qualified products (Van Hout & Bingham, 2013). Precisely this system makes 
crypto-markets unique, offering a bilateral reputation mechanism that instils trust in both 
merchants and buyers, protecting the anonymity of both and facilitating repeated 
transactions (Hardy & Norgaard, 2016). Crypto-markets tend to specialize primarily in 
the sale of illegal drugs (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014) or related products, but they also 
offer listings linked to other fraudulent activities, including stolen credit cards, identity 
information, and firearms, less commonly available for sale than the other categories 
(Paoli et al., 2017). 
 The other type of activity available in darknets is the so-called vendor shop, also 
known as a 'single seller shop', pages created directly by the supplier of the product or 
service, which in many cases trades in parallel on a crypto-market. Vendor shops on the 
dark web are positioned as points where specialized products are sold, with particular 
attention to the arms trade (Paoli et al., 2017), as opposed to crypto markets that offer 
many products and services.  
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 This underground economy must not be understood as a unitary system, on the 
contrary, the Darkmarkets differ from each other especially about the country of origin 
(Trend Micro, 2015). Today, the expansion of the phenomenon of online darkmarkets is 
enormous and tends increasingly using new technologies to refine. Being a constantly 
changing reality in a vast world like that of the web, despite the differences that exist 
between the different markets, cybercriminals collaborate, sharing tools, information, 
know-how and best practices aimed at improving illegal trade in the network. The most 
selected product categories in the darkmarkets are drugs, fake documents, counterfeit 
banknotes, credit card or bank account data, weapons, and explosives, as well as malware 
and other hacking tools. Thus, to prevent any risks associated with controls, there are 
various techniques for hiding products, discussed, and implemented on dedicated 
forums, both on the dark web and on clearnets (Paoli et al., 2017). One of the most used 
techniques is to ship products together with others, such as those associated with 
consumer electronics: printers, smartphones, televisions, or in instrument cases with a 
double bottom (Paoli et al., 2017). The commercial system of the crypto-markets ensures 
as well as the guarantee of product quality through feedback, quality and safety in 
shipping or prior agreements or pre-established rules, creating a structured model with 
a monthly turnover of tens of millions of euros (EMCDDA, 2019).  
 One of the most perpetrated activities in Darkmarkets, usually immediately after 
the sale of drugs, is the supply of false documents (Europol, 2017), such as passports, 
identity documents, driving licenses, birth certificates, etc. On the Darkmarkets, from 
their creation to the present day, the buying and selling of stolen account information, 
bank accounts and credit card numbers continues. Personal and bank data are often the 
second or third category of 'raw materials' listed in the darkmarkets and one of the most 
common products highlighted by law enforcement (IOCTA, 2019). In the Darkmarkets, 
in addition to weapons and explosives, ammunition, knives, ordnance equipment and 
digital products for support are sold, such as eBooks that provide instructions for the 
manufacture and assembly of explosives and weapons (IOCTA, 2019). 
 Another type of weapons, particularly fashionable in the digital age, sold in dark 
networks are 'malware': malicious programs ranging from simple frequency recording 
software to steal sensitive data from the user to sophisticated and professional software 
that can intercept, alter or hijack the victim's data (IOCTA, 2019). Research on the topic 
highlights the growing distribution of these digital tools, among the biggest sellers are 
'ransomware' (Broadhurst et al., 2018), a program that disables a victim's device until a 
ransom is paid which frees the system from the block. In addition to these, we find the 
distribution of Trojans or viruses such as 'exploits' (i.e. crime-ware to extort money or 
sensitive data from PC) and 'botnets' (i.e. nets composed of devices infected with 
specialized malware, called bots or zombies) capable carry DoS (Denial-of-Service) 
attacks or related DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks, particularly harmful. 
Every banking institution, company or public administration uses computerized systems 
that can be an easy target by malicious people intent on blocking a system for the purpose 
not only of extorting sensitive information but of destabilizing entire IT structures 
dedicated to providing essential services. 
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 Another growing activity, especially in recent years, is the online gambling 
industry (Choi, 2018) which, with the use of cryptocurrencies, is exploited for money 
laundering purposes (Fiedler, 2013). Millions of transactions take place daily on the 
Internet and criminal organizations have been taking advantage of this for more than two 
decades to launder illegally acquired funds through secret and anonymous online 
transactions (Richet, 2013). Cyber money laundering depends on the use of various types 
of transactions and financial service providers, ranging from bank transfers, cash 
deposit/withdrawal to e-money and cryptocurrency transactions (EAG, 2014). An 
incisive push towards the digitalization process of money laundering was the 
introduction of virtual currencies and subsequently of cryptocurrencies (UIF, 2018). 
 
3. Regulations and public policies in the fight against the underground economy of 
digitised organised crime 
 
As previously highlighted, the expansion of digital media has meant that organized crime 
has evolved, adapting to new technologies and innovating; therefore, criminal 
organizations have evolved from traditional crimes to 'cybercrimes’. By cybercrime we 
mean a set of crimes (Cadoppi et al., 2019) that can be configured: a) when the computer 
is used as a target (e.g., abusive access to a computer to collect or eliminate data (e.g., DoS 
and DDoS), dissemination of viruses and malware to lock down the system or other 
hacking functions); b) when using the computer as a means or tool used to commit any 
criminal conduct (e.g., the different types of telematic fraud (i.e., carding, phishing, etc.) 
or online harassment); c) when the computer is used as an accessory for crime, that is, all 
those activities that would have been carried out equally but that can be helped by the 
use of the computer (e.g., child pornography, money laundering, or trade online). 
Cybercrime occurs in a split second and can spread with surprising speed (Brenner & 
Clarke, 2004). Law enforcement and security agencies must therefore act quickly and be 
able to collect and store digital evidence for use in criminal proceedings. However, 
information and communication technologies are unfamiliar to the traditional world of 
criminal justice and, therefore, practitioners must constantly retrain the sector by 
requiring well-trained personnel in new techniques in the investigation phase, during 
criminal proceedings and in the courts (Chaikin, 2006). Furthermore, to effectively 
address cybercrime repression problems, different national criminal justice systems need 
to update their legislation and law enforcement systems as they are unable to cope with 
the investigation and prosecution of the crime phenomenon. 
 
3.1. An International overview 
There are several international agreements including the ‘Budapest Convention’ also 
known as 'The Cybercrime Convention' and the ‘Framework Decision 2013/40 /EU’ 
related to complementary operational bodies (such as police forces acting at national and 
supranational level), which they seek to provide new tools and improve international 
cooperation. The International Criminal Police Organization, Interpol, is committed to 
being a global coordinating body for the detection and prevention of digital crimes. 
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Interpol through the Global Complex for Innovation (2014) aims to share skills and avoid 
duplication of activities already underway, so that law enforcement agencies can 
effectively focus their resources on the fight against cybercrime, collaborating with others 
stakeholders to develop a coordinated response to this growing threat. The countries of 
the G7 (G8 from 1998 to 2014) (UNIDIR, 2020) during the various meetings went to 
emphasize more and more the danger represented by cybercrime, while the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) hosts within it, one of the 
most effective organizations for intergovernmental coordination of law enforcement 
agencies, offering models for transnational cooperation against cybercrime: the 
International Financial Action Group. It is an intergovernmental organization whose goal 
is the implementation of legislative and regulatory reforms necessary to combat money 
laundering.  
 
3.2 A European overview 
Within the European Union, several supranational institutions are included that address 
the challenges posed by international cybercrime by adopting common positions, 
directives, and other tools to combat a wide range of criminal activities. The decision, 
following the ratification of the Budapest Convention, is the beginning of a path of 
harmonization of the legislation aimed at the fight against cybercrime in the various 
member states of the European Union. Precisely to increase cooperation in the judicial 
sense, which goes beyond a network of contacts, in 2002, the Eurojust was set up by the 
Council of Ministers of the European Union, a body which brings together the judicial 
institutions of the various countries with the aim of criminal cooperation. One of the 
results of the Eurojust meetings was the foundation, in 2016, of the Eurojust European 
Judicial Cybercrime Network (EJCN, 2016), a network aimed at fostering contacts between 
professionals and specialists in countering the challenges posed by cybercrime. Fully 
integrated into the European Union, with the Council decision 2009/371/JHA on 6 April 
2009, is Europol, that is the EU police office which today represents one of the reference 
bodies for the fight against cybercrime; Parliament adopted a new regulation (2016/794) 
on 11 May 2016 to allow Europol to intensify its efforts to combat terrorism, cybercrime 
as well as organized crime and serious forms of crime. The Decision also went to 
strengthen the European commitment against serious forms of organized crime as 
described in the working document on organized crime (2012). Thus, an attempt was 
made to facilitate the exchange of information, provide analyses, strategic reports on 
trends and patterns of criminal activity, exchanging technical expertise for ongoing 
investigations within the EU.  
 In 2013 Europol established the European Cybercrime Centre, an operational body 
that deals with cybercrime, basing its work on operational, technical, and analytical 
support for Member States' investigations. The centre, the result of Directive 2013/40/EU 
promulgated by the Parliament and the Council, has as its task the fight against 
cybercrimes committed by organized groups, in particular those that generate large 
profits such as online fraud, the sexual exploitation of minors online, cyber-attacks 
targeting critical European infrastructure systems and trade in dark networks, including 
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cyber money laundering. The group is engaged every year in drafting a strategic report 
on key discoveries, emerging threats and developments in cybercrime called 'Internet 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment' (IOCTA). The document provides key 
recommendations for law enforcement and policymakers to enable them to respond to 
cyber threats effectively and in concert (IOCTA, 2019). The fundamental role played by 
this set of institutions, however, remains severely limited, lacking an autonomous power 
of initiative in the criminal field. This may be due to a certain reluctance of Member States 
to deprive themselves of a part of sovereignty as important and linked to the territory as 
that deriving from the exercises of the police forces.  
 
3.3 An Italian overview 
In Italy, a step forward was made by the Decree of the Minister of the Interior of 28 April 
2006, entitled "Reorganisation of the speciality sectors of the Police Forces". The Decree 
determined the Postal Police as a body specializing in combating crimes perpetrated 
through the Internet and the use of computerized electronic means, thus making the body 
the major national actor in the fight against cybercrime. With a further ministerial decree 
dated January 9, 2008, the CNAIP, the National Cybercrime Centre for the Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures, was officially established, a non-executive level organizational 
unit, based on the Postal Police service. A few months later, the 2001 Budapest 
Convention was officially ratified, with the law of 18 March 2008, n. 48, among which the 
main changes added to the Italian Penal Code is article 615-quinquies "Dissemination of 
equipment, devices or computer programs aimed at damaging or interrupting a computer or 
telematic system" (also referring to those who wish to spread different types of malware 
or programs aimed at committing a crime on the Internet through the dark web). Over 
time, the Postal Police has tried to limit activities in the Darknet by helping to refine 
methods and tools shared in the context of international police collaboration with various 
foreign investigative agencies and making use of the coordination of Europol's European 
Cybercrime Centre (J-CAT, 2020). The central problem, about investigations on the 
matter, remains the anonymity which in its evolution is showing more and more 
impermeability to intrusion attempts by the security bodies. By not allowing the 
traceability of criminals operating in the Darknets, the police forces cannot impute those 
responsible.  
 
3.4 Developments in Criminal Law 
In addition to the various initiatives undertaken (i.e., Global Complex for Innovation and 
European Cybercrime Centre of Europol), we must think of a coercive regulatory 
response that knows how to put a margin both on the disproportionate use made by the 
hidden services of darknets and on the spread of criminal organizations, traditional or 
otherwise, in the network scenario. The process of harmonization of national laws, 
coming from the EU institutions, is the ideal tool of Community law to trace this path. 
The laws of the Member States are different, and these differences can hinder the 
achievement of the objectives set out in the Treaties. Harmonization is how to eliminate 
or reduce these disparities. Since the Maastricht Treaty, criminal justice issues have been 
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considered the exclusive domain of the Member States, considering the need for 
harmonization of criminal law to be marginal. After more than ten years, to face the 
challenge of cross-border crime, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) introduced the possibility for 
the European Union to legislate in criminal matters through the use of the directive; an 
instrument that binds the Member States to achieve a certain result, leaving the possibility 
for national bodies to choose the form and means with which to implement it. The 
abolition of the pillar structure of the Amsterdam Treaty allowed the Parliament and the 
Council to become decision-makers also in criminal matters, making Europol fall within 
the legal framework of the Union. In particular, in the fourth chapter of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2012), entitled "Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters", article 82 traces the framework of competences of the European Union in the 
field of criminal procedure (such as mutual admissibility of evidence between the 
Member States) and article 83 performs a similar task in the field of substantive criminal 
law. The latter provides that the European Union may, using directives, dictate "minimum 
regulations relating to the definition of crimes and sanctions in particularly serious crime areas 
that have a transnational dimension deriving from the character or implications of such crimes or 
from a particular need to fight them on a common basis". Among the areas of crime considered 
are present in the article: "terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of 
women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, 
counterfeiting of means of payment, cybercrime and organized crime". 
 Up to now, the current influence of the European integration model about the 
criminal field has been limited and well below the potential offered by Article 83 of the 
TFEU (2012). This is because there is still no real desire for judicial harmonization in the 
broad sense extended to all member states of the European Union. In addition to the 
mutual recognition of cooperation between judicial and police forces, common problems 
must be reacted with common solutions, especially in the digital age, in which national 
borders are not enough to contain the new threats coming from the net. A common 
solution could be to criminalize access to some areas of the Onion Routing, discouraging 
customer access to Darkmarkets. The Onion Routing allows users to create sites, exactly 
like those on the web on the surface, acting as a server. These 'hidden services' are the 
technology behind Darkmarkets and other commercial activities through which 
organized criminals carry out numerous illegal acts. It is therefore important both 
nationally and internationally that access to certain hidden services be criminalized so 
that the police can use them in the processual phase. Another solution could be to 
harmonize European legislation on the criminal association as provided for in article 416 
of the Italian Penal Code, both online and when it comes to criminal organizations of the 
mafia type. Since article 416 of the Penal code was written at a time when digital 
communications did not exist, the criteria to be used to verify its application in the virtual 
context appear uncertain today. It is thus necessary to integrate the provisions of article 
416 of the Italian Penal Code to ensure that they can also be applied to the virtual context. 
If our operating systems become "domiciles" it is right to make the owners responsible 
for controlling them. The Supreme Court has expressed in this regard that the violation 
of an IT system is equal to the violation of domicile (Penal Cassation no. 36338/2015), with 
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reference to article 615-ter of the Penal Code, "Unauthorized access to an IT or telematic 
system". The new digital means that provide access to the net are potential weapons 
through which organized groups can commit electronic fraud, abusive access or publish 
child pornography, and it is right that they are linked to the legitimate responsible owner. 
In Europe, the contrast of mafia-type criminal associations remains a debated and 
evolving issue. The starting point of any response originates from the provisions 
provided by the Italian criminal law system, from article 416-bis of the Penal Code which 




Criminal organizations exploit the Internet, as a vast unregulated space, to transfer their 
activities online, using anonymity techniques to guarantee immunity. Criminal 
networks, with the arrival of new network technologies, have found further ways and 
spaces through which to commit a crime, especially in online darkmarkets and through 
new means of laundering illicit proceeds. Furthermore, the organizations engaged in 
these commercial activities have expanded their sales sphere to an increasingly large 
international clientele, thus increasing their earnings prospects and exploiting new 
means of payment such as cryptocurrencies to launder money, evading many of the 
controls imposed on financial institutions by anti-money laundering laws. The opening 
of new illegal markets has helped to increase the turnover of organized crime by billions 
of euros (UNODC, 2011). Such huge sums of money, the result of illicit sales, are invested 
in building contracts, bars, restaurants, shops and betting centres, which in addition to 
having the function of cleaning up dirty money, increase the capital of criminal 
organizations which, if widespread and rooted in the territory, they can influence the 
various spheres of politics and decision-making processes of an entire country.  
 To try to understand what the responses are aimed at combating these new 
criminal phenomena, a regulatory framework and institutions have been outlined to 
combat illegal activities in the Darknet. Although progress has been made in trying to 
keep digitised organised crime under control, there is still a lack of uniformity between 
national and European institutions in this area, while there is still no adequate regulation 
of the dark web. Articles 82 and 83 of the TFEU (2012) give the Union's decision-making 
bodies powers in criminal matters, but these powers today remain unexercised. One of 
the main causes remains the willingness shown by States to maintain full sovereignty in 
criminal justice, especially in the current crisis of the European institutions. However, in 
the light of the exponential increase in online criminal activity in recent years and even 
25% between the first and second quarter of 2020 due to the coronavirus emergency 
(Zorloni, 2020), it is therefore necessary that the individual Member States put aside 
uncertainties, using the European Union as a fulcrum in the fight against transnational 
organized crime. A common solution could be to criminalise access to certain areas of the 
Onion Routing and integrate the provisions of article 416 of the Penal Code (criminal 
association) to ensure that they can also be applied to the digital context. Furthermore, it 
would be desirable that the crime of mafia-type criminal association be finally established 
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as specified in article 416-bis of the Italian Penal Code, as it is still a case unique in the 
European legislative landscape. 
 
Conflict of interest 
The authors declare no conflicts of interest. 
 
Authors’ contribution 





Aldridge, J., & Décary-Hétu, D. (2014). Not an 'Ebay for Drugs': the Cryptomarket 'Silk Road' 
as a paradigm shifting criminal innovation. Available at SSRN 2436643. 
Board meeting joint cybercrime action taskforce (J-CAT) (2020). Available at 
https://www.commissariatodips.it/notizie/articolo/board-meeting-joint-
cybercrime-action-taskforce/index.html 
Brenner, S. W., & Clarke, L. L. (2004). Distributed security: Preventing cybercrime. John 
Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law, 23, 659. 
Broadhurst, R., Lord, D., Maxim, D., Woodford-Smith, H., Johnston, C., Chung, H. W., ... 
& Sabol, B. (2018). Malware trends on ‘darknet’ crypto-markets: Research 
review. Available at SSRN 3226758. 
Cadoppi, A., Canestrari, S., Manna, A., & Papa, M. (2019). Cybercrime. Vicenza: UTET 
Giuridica. 
Chaikin, D. (2006). Network investigations of cyber-attacks: the limits of digital 
evidence. Crime, Law and Social Change, 46(4-5), 239-256. 
Choi, S. (2018). Illegal Gambling and Its Operation via the Darknet and Bitcoin: An Application 




Cipolla, A. (2018). Antimafia: “Così la Camorra guadagna con la Borsa e i Bitcoin”. Available 
at https://www.money.it/antimafia-camorra-guadagna-borsa-bitcoin 
Costa, A.M. (2010). The Globalization of Crime - A Transnational Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment, preface by executive director p. iii. UNODC Report. Retrieved from 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf 
Decree of the Minister of the Interior of 28 April 2006. Retrieved from 
https://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/site/it/sezioni/servizi/old_servizi/legisla
zione/polizia/legislazione_769.html 
Decree of the Ministry of the Interior of 9 January 2008. Retrieved from 
https://www.poliziadistato.it/statics/44/d.m.-9-gennio-2008-istituzione-
cnaipic.pdf 
Fulvio Greco, Gianpiero Greco 
ORGANISED CRIME: UNDERGROUND ECONOMY AND REGULATIONS TO COMBAT CYBERCRIME
 
European Journal of Political Science Studies - Volume 4 │ Issue 1 │ 2020                                                                          37 
Directive 2013/40/UE. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/it/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32013L0040 
EJCN (2016). Retrieved from 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/Practitioners/Pages/EJCN.aspx 
EMCDDA, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/edr2019_en 
Eu Parliamentary question (2018). Retrieved from 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2018-005054_IT.html 
Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) 
(2014). Cybercrime and Money Laundering. Retrieved from 
https://eurasiangroup.org/files/Typologii%20EAG/Tipologiya_kiber_EAG_2014_
English.pdf 
Eurojust (2002). Retrieved from 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/PressReleases/Documents/2018-04-
26_Eurojust-FactSheet.pdf 
European Cybercrime Centre (2013). Retrieved from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3 
Europol (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/794. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0794 
Europol (2017). Priority for the Eu policy cycle from 2018 to 2021. Document fraud. Retrieved 
from https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/eu-policy-cycle-
empact 
Falcone, G. (1991). Cose di Cosa Nostra. Rizzoli. 
Fiedler, I. (2013). Online Gambling as a Game Changer to Money Laundering? Available at 
SSRN 2261266 
Hardy, R. A., & Norgaard, J. R. (2016). Reputation in the Internet black market: an 
empirical and theoretical analysis of the Deep Web. Journal of Institutional 
Economics, 12(3), 515-539. 
Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) (2019). Report retrieved from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/internet-
organised-crime-threat-assessment 
INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation. Retrieved from 
https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2014/INTERPOL-Global-
Complex-for-Innovation-opens-its-doors 
Irwin, A. S., & Milad, G. (2016). The use of crypto currencies in funding violent 
jihad. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 19(4), 407-425. 
J. P. & G. T. (2011). Bits and Bob, The Economist: Babbage 13-06-2011. Retrieved from 
https://www.economist.com/babbage/2011/06/13/bits-and-bob 
Law n. 48 of 18 March 2008. Retrieved from https://www.normattiva.it/uri-
res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2008-03-18;48!vig= 
Leukfeldt, E. R., Lavorgna, A., & Kleemans, E. R. (2017). Organised cybercrime or 
cybercrime that is organised? An assessment of the conceptualisation of financial 
cybercrime as organised crime. European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research, 23(3), 287-300. 
Fulvio Greco, Gianpiero Greco 
ORGANISED CRIME: UNDERGROUND ECONOMY AND REGULATIONS TO COMBAT CYBERCRIME
 
European Journal of Political Science Studies - Volume 4 │ Issue 1 │ 2020                                                                          38 
Matonis, J. (2012). ECB: Roots of Bitcoin Can be Found in The Austrian School of 
Economics. posted to Forbes (online), November 3, 2012. 
McGuire, M. (2012). Organised Crime in the Digital Age. London: John Grieve Centre for 
Policing and Security. 
Paoli, G. P., Aldridge, J., Ryan, N., & Warnes, R. (2017). Behind the Curtain: The Illicit 
Trade of Firearms. Explosives and Ammunition on the Dark Web, RAND Corporation, 
Santa Monica, CA. 
Penal Cassation n. 36338/2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.italgiure.giustizia.it/xway/application/nif/clean/hc.dll?verbo=attach
&db=snpen&id=./20150909/snpen@s10@a2015@n36338@tS.clean.pdf 
Penal Code (2020). Retrieved from https://www.brocardi.it/codice-penale/ 
Richet, J. L. (2013). Laundering Money Online: a review of cybercriminals’ methods. Available 
at https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.2368 




Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) - Consolidated version (2012). 
Available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT:IT:PDF 
Trend Micro (2015). Cybercrime and the Deep Web - Forward-Looking Threat Research (FTR) 
Team. Available at 
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/it/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-
threats/qna-deep-web-anonymity-and-law-enforcement 
UNIDIR (2020). Cyber Policy Portal. Group of Seven (G7). Retrieved from 
https://unidir.org/cpp/en/organization-pdf-
export/eyJvcmdhbml6YXRpb25fZ3JvdXBfaWQiOiI2In0 
Unità di Informazione Finanziaria per l’Italia (UIF) (2018). Casistiche di riciclaggio e di 
finanziamento del terrorismo. Quaderni dell’antiriciclaggio, n.11. 
UNODC (2011). Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other 
Transnational Organized Crime. Research report retrieved from 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf 
Van Hout, M. C., & Bingham, T. (2013). ‘Silk Road’, the virtual drug marketplace: A single 
case study of user experiences. International Journal of Drug Policy, 24(5), 385-391. 
Working document on organized crime (2012). Retrieved from 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/crim/dt/913/91
3961/913961it.pdf 
Zorloni, L. (2020). L'Europa lavora alle nuove regole sulla cybersecurity per alzare le difese. 
Retrieved from https://www.wired.it/internet/regole/2020/09/17/cybersecurity-
europa-direttiva-nis/ 
Fulvio Greco, Gianpiero Greco 
ORGANISED CRIME: UNDERGROUND ECONOMY AND REGULATIONS TO COMBAT CYBERCRIME
 







































































Creative Commons licensing terms 
Author(s) will retain the copyright of their published articles agreeing that a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) terms 
will be applied to their work. Under the terms of this license, no permission is required from the author(s) or publisher for members of the community 
to copy, distribute, transmit or adapt the article content, providing a proper, prominent and unambiguous attribution to the authors in a manner that 
makes clear that the materials are being reused under permission of a Creative Commons License. Views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this 
research article are views, opinions and conclusions of the author(s). Open Access Publishing Group and European Journal of Social Sciences Studies 
shall not be responsible or answerable for any loss, damage or liability caused in relation to/arising out of conflicts of interest, copyright violations and 
inappropriate or inaccurate use of any kind content related or integrated into the research work. All the published works are meeting the Open Access 
Publishing requirements and can be freely accessed, shared, modified, distributed and used in educational, commercial and non-commercial purposes 
under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). 
